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Book Review

A Global Collection
Reviewing The Global Limits of Competition Law
(Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2012)
Max Huffman†
The Global Limits of Competition Law is the first installment in Daniel Sokol’s and Ioannis Lianos’s ambitious new series from Stanford University Press, Global Competition Law
and Economics.1 The project is ambitious because it takes on a
potentially unbounded topic, and one that is constantly changing. It is also ambitious because Sokol and Lianos enter a saturated market. This first volume is sufficiently captivating, and
represents such an extraordinary breadth of national and regional perspectives, that the authors appear to have fulfilled
their ambitions.
Sokol and Lianos need no introduction to a follower of recent antitrust scholarship. Through their own scholarly
achievements and extensive world-wide connections in the antitrust bar, bench, and academy, they are well—perhaps
uniquely—positioned to bring together a collection of this sort.
Sokol has published vigorously on a range of antitrust topics,
employing comparative, international, and institutionalist perspectives to a degree that few, if any, in the U.S. academy can
claim.2 The Paul Caron of antitrust, he has a huge popular fol† Associate Professor and Dean’s Fellow, IU Robert H. McKinney School
of Law. Mark Anderson provided helpful insights. Eleanor Frisch of Headnotes
provided tremendous editorial input. Copyright © 2013 by Max Huffman.
1. THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW (Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL LIMITS].
2. See, e.g., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Eleanor
M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1081 (2009); D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 37 (2007).
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lowing through his work on the Antitrust & Competition Policy
Blog.3 Early in his career, Sokol has achieved the enviable position of setting the terms of the scholarly dialogue. Sokol’s work
on the “antitrust law prof blog” deserves special mention in the
light of this global collection. I am not being hyperbolic in proposing that one of the top few, if not the single, greatest contributions to antitrust thought in recent years has been the daily
exposure of lawyers, judges, policy-makers, and scholars to
work in competition policy being done around the globe.
Lianos is a leader in the study of global competition law
and economics. He has written and edited several books and
dozens of articles and book chapters, usually employing a comparative perspective. Lianos is well situated to bring off a multi-volume study of global competition law and economics. A
lawyer and social scientist himself, he has published papers in
at least three languages. He has taught in Britain, France, and
the U.S., and he has worked with competition law enforcement
agencies in both Europe and the U.S.
In The Global Limits of Competition Law, Lianos and Sokol
appear to have followed a tried-and-true approach to producing
a top-quality collaborative publication. They brought together
an extraordinary cast of contributors, from leaders of the U.S.
antitrust academy to noted economists, lawyers, and professors
spanning four continents.4 Then, it appears they got out of the
way and let their contributors do what they do best. Their approach produced a marvelous diversity of topics and points of
view. The book juxtaposes George Priest’s study of the origin
and influence of the Chicago School of Antitrust5 with Arianna
Andreangeli’s study of the European Convention on Human
Rights’ relevance for competition law enforcement.6 Sokol
writes about the competition policy implications of government
regulation.7 Jeffrey Harrison discusses surprising complica3. D. Daniel Sokol, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/. Professor Paul Caron is
the Editor-in-Chief of Law Professor Blogs LLC. LAW PROFESSORS BLOGS,
http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com.
4. See GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at xi–xiv.
5. George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 15.
6. Arianna Andreangeli, Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a
Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory Intervention, in GLOBAL
LIMITS, supra note 1, at 22.
7. D. Daniel Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, in GLOBAL
LIMITS, supra note 1, at 83.
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tions of the treatment of monopsony in U.S. law.8 Lianos imports lessons from Easterbrook’s The Limits of Antitrust9 to inform the difficult question of remedying antitrust violations.10
And it goes on.
I. THE LIMITS BRAND
Lianos and Sokol’s approach is not without drawbacks. Lianos and Sokol make a heroic effort in the book to weave together a collection of fundamentally disparate scholarly
works.11 They confess their challenge up front; any effort to
draw out Easterbrook’s seminal 1984 article to the global context necessarily will be frustrated by the article’s ultimately
narrow reach. The Limits of Antitrust is about intrinsic limits
on U.S.-style antitrust enforcement.12 Easterbrook’s argument
is fundamentally institutionalist rather than substantive in nature. He did not write with an eye to other enforcement systems with different procedures and different goals. It is unclear
to what degree, for example, Easterbrook’s concern with false
positives in enforcement would apply in a jurisdiction without a
private remedy, without punitive treble damages recovery,
without the common law’s stasis, and with technocrats at the
center of the enforcement program—in short, a jurisdiction in
which error is less likely and less costly.
Mr. Tapia and Mr. Montt’s contribution, Judicial Scrutiny
and Competition Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Antitrust,13 recognizes this reality: “Easterbrook’s insights on the
‘judicial’ limits of antitrust crucially depend on the specific institutional design and the incentives it creates.”14 They note that
the prosecutorial system with decision-making by (and appeals
to) generalist courts, which describes both private and Department of Justice enforcement in the United States, may be “idio8. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Complications in the Antitrust Response to Monopsony, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 54.
9. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(1984).
10. Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a Theory, in
GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 177.
11. See Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, Introduction, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra note 1, at 1.
12. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 4.
13. See Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny & Competition
Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Antitrust, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra
note 1, at 141.
14. Id.
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syncratic to the legal, institutional, and historical realities of
the . . . United States.”15 Tapia and Montt conclude that
“[p]olitical, legal and economic, and cultural idiosyncratic factors are too relevant to provide general answers” about institutional limits.16
There is even the question of whether a limit must be institutional in nature. Easterbrook’s limit of antitrust was a combination of mostly institutional features that Easterbrook contends renders antitrust unable to produce defensible results
outside a narrowly drawn sphere.17 Professor Andreangeli’s
contribution, Competition Law and Human Rights: Striking a
Balance Between Business Freedom and Regulatory Intervention, raises an institutional concern that may be unique to the
EU experience, although the due process concerns with a
“[c]ommission [that] acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge
in the cases it deals with” and that renders “decisions [that] are
subject to only limited review”18 have been raised with regard
to the Federal Trade Commission as well.19 Tapia and Montt
follow the institutional limits approach, as do other contributors to Global Limits—including Lianos, whose chapter on
remedies is examined more closely below. Other authors (not
contributing to this collection) employing the limits branding
define it similarly.20
One might propose a broader definition of limits that recognizes social goals that competition policy cannot achieve regardless of institutional structure. This broader definition of
limits is at the core of the tension between regulation and antitrust.21 Regulation may seek to achieve goals like the public in15. Id. at 148.
16. Id. at 156.
17. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1–4, 14–15, 39–40.
18. Andreangeli, supra note 6, at 23.
19. See Mark Leddy et al., Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts and
the Agencies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 51–52 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Goeffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 177–78, 189–244 (2011) (relying on Easterbrook’s errorcost framework to argue that uncertainty favors lesser enforcement); Philip J.
Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, & Beyond,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 272 (2009) (limits of antitrust include institutional
limits on the ability to deal with rapidly changing technology industries).
21. This limit of competition policy is also implicated by constitutional
questions under, for example, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (First Amendment Petition Clause immunity) and the Parker v. Brown doctrine (stateaction immunity based on federalism). See generally, United Mine Workers of
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terest22 or maximal estate value.23 Regulation’s diverse goals
may be broader than those of competition policy, which (in the
United States) are frequently stated to be economic efficiency
in service of consumers,24 or even more succinctly, keeping
prices low.25 Regulation’s goals may also be narrower than
those of competition policy, which extend to the entire economy
rather than to the sector under the regulator’s jurisdiction (or
the estate under the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction).26 Under
this approach, the limit of competition policy is where the social
policy goal deviates from, or is even antithetical to, the goals of
competition policy.27

Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R. R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943).
22. In the case of FCC and FAA regulation. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS 286–88 (3d ed. 2006); see also, e.g., 47 U.S.C. 309(a), (d),
310(d) (FCC); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS,
AT&T/T-Mobile Merger, No. 11-65, at 3 (2011) (competitive concerns undermine public interest requirement); cf. 49 U.S.C. 41105 (requiring DOT approval for transfer of air carrier certificates); 14 C.F.R. pt. 135, FAA Order No.
8900.1 ¶¶ 3-3591–3-3596 (describing changes that follow from airline mergers
which require FAA approval). See generally Howard Shelanski, Justice Breyer,
Professor Kahn, and Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Industries, 100 CAL.
L. REV. 487, 505–06 (2012) (noting conflict between the FCC’s broader public
interest standard and antitrust’s competition goals).
23. In the case of bankruptcy courts. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857,
857 (1982) ("[M]ost of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned with creditor-distribution questions."). See generally Max Huffman, Worlds in Collision:
Merger Policy in Bankruptcy (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (contrasting efficiency and consumer protection goals of antitrust with
the estate-value-maximization goals of bankruptcy reorganization).
24. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (2d ed. 1993); Max
Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 7 (2010); Paolisa Nebbia,
Competition Law and Consumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial Practices: A More-than-Complementary Relationship?, in GLOBAL LIMITS, supra
note 1, at 127.
25. See Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006).
26. Whether the “entire economy” means the global economy, a national
economy, or something in between (e.g., a free trade zone or fiscal union)
might be the subject of much debate. The rule for U.S. antitrust appears to be
that antitrust’s efficiency goals serve the U.S. economy only. See F. HoffmanLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that U.S.
antitrust laws may be applied to foreign conduct to redress domestic antitrust
injury).
27. This definition may beg as many questions as it answers: for example,
to what degree a particular social policy like universal service in telephony or
air transport deviates from efficiency and consumer-protection goals.
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The regulation-competition interface underlies Sokol’s contribution, Anticompetitive Government Regulation.28 Rather
than merely seeing the regulation-competition interface as another possible limit, Sokol asserts that “the real limit of antitrust is that antitrust enforcement (particularly public enforcement) may not reach the type of conduct that is most
harmful to economic development—anticompetitive government regulation.”29 Sokol draws on his scholarly work in the
field of competition advocacy as a solution to regulation that
champions another policy over the narrow efficiency goals of
antitrust.30
Under this second understanding of limits—antitrust’s
goals’ being subordinated to other social policies—it would be
difficult or impossible to articulate a global limit, even a set of
global limits, on competition policy. The limit will always be
where some other social policy goal overcomes those goals that
competition policy advances. That can be a substantive question in the case of a particular regime that narrowly defines the
goals of competition policy.31 It can be an institutional question
in the more difficult case of a regime that, like the United
States, leaves the goals of antitrust open to interpretation and
common-law development.
This latter approach will draw limits broadly where the institutions in place are capable of applying the law, and narrowly where they are not. The substantive and institutional limits
themselves can be in tension. A substantive prohibition of price
discrimination explicitly written into the antitrust laws in the
United States and elsewhere reflects an extension of antitrust
into the consumer-protection realm. That prohibition violates
some commentators’ sense of drawing limits narrowly based on
institutional considerations, because price discrimination may
be efficient and its prohibition inefficient,32 and because some
do not trust our institutions to discern which is which.
28. Sokol, Anticompetitive Government Regulation, supra note 7, at 83.
29. Id. at 83–84.
30. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119 (2009).
31. This demonstrates the profound effect of defining the goals of antitrust narrowly to be only low prices in service of consumer interests. Antitrust
enforcement will be curtailed any time the goals to be achieved do not include
low prices.
32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 27 (2d ed. 2001). Posner sees
this as one of “two principal exceptions” to “the natural, the feasible, and the
legitimate” economic guide to interpreting the U.S. antitrust laws. Id.
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All this shows that there is no content to the idea of limits
on competition policy. Defining limits becomes a Rorschach test
for a commentator’s views on the value of competition policy
generally. Charged with writing about global limits, Lianos and
Sokol’s contributors gamely do so, but frequently in terms that
are unrelated to Easterbrook’s thesis. I found myself applauding that result. After a glut of scholarly work borrowing the
limits brand that arose around the twenty-fifth anniversary of
Easterbrook’s work, it was refreshing to read about limits writ
large, rather than the narrowly defined intrinsic failings of U.S.
antitrust as it was enforced in the 1970s. And Lianos and Sokol
structure this volume “start[ing] with the traditional limits imposed by the antitrust law process”—what I have called institutional or intrinsic limits—”before addressing other, broader
limits of competition law relating to competition economics,
synergies with other areas of law, institutional design, and culture.”33
II. SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS
This review is concentrated on several of the chapters, selected partly at random, partly based on my interest in a particular author’s work, and partly based on my interest in a particular topic. These chosen chapters are not necessarily
representative: this is an incredibly broad and varied volume
with contributions from around the world.
A. PROFESSOR PRIEST
George Priest may be uniquely positioned to teach about
the history and meaning of the Chicago School of Antitrust,
having been present for its early development but not frequently identified with the movement himself. His chapter, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, teaches that
the Chicago School has its roots in early volumes of the Journal
of Law & Economics and Friedrich Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society. The society “was, and to some extent still is, dedicated to the
proposition that political interference with market activities is
harmful to freedom—though the society avoided a purely libertarian approach.”34 That same minimalist program underlay
Chicago School antitrust, which was “skeptical of governmental
and judicial interference” but “never advocated abandoning an33. See Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 1–2.
34. Priest, supra note 5, at 15.
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titrust law in the Armentano libertarian way. The Chicago
School tradition sought to constrain antitrust law—chiefly by
ridiculing its excesses—but accepted antitrust enforcement as
an underlying background condition of market activity.”35
Lianos and Sokol introduce Priest’s contribution as “historical context for Easterbrook’s writing.”36 History would be
enough, but Priest’s chapter is much more. He describes the
“often unappreciated,” “political dimension” of the Coase theorem37 and its relevance to Chicago School antitrust.38 Priest
conceptualizes the Coase theorem as supporting a noninterference role for the government in markets. Government
support should be limited to reducing transaction costs, which
would enhance welfare.39 That is a precursor to the view, fundamental to Easterbrook’s error-cost analysis in The Limits of
Antitrust, that “courts will make erroneous judgments.”40 Priest
sees Easterbrook’s error-cost analysis as a refinement of Chicago School antitrust, making the critique useful rather than
merely hostile. In contrast with Robert Bork’s “sarcastic tone,
largely dismissive of the ability of . . . courts to understand industrial organization,” Easterbrook “addresses, as science, the
implications of inevitable judicial error for the fashioning of effective antitrust rules.”41 Priest does not draw the comparison
in this chapter, but the preference for the Easterbrook approach over the Bork approach harkens to recent discussions of
a “Neo-Chicago School,” which seeks to improve antitrust rules
in light of error-cost analysis and empirical research.42
Priest does not plow much new ground, and his contribution is limited to the U.S. antitrust experience. Because understanding the history of antitrust law and economics is helpful
to its further development, because the U.S. experience with
antitrust law and economics offers a lesson for global competition policy, and because Easterbrook’s article has made an outsize contribution to the subsequent common-law development
in U.S. antitrust, Priest’s chapter is as important as it is inter35. Id. at 19.
36. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 2.
37. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
Econ. 1 (1960).
38. See Priest, supra note 5, at 17.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. See Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust,
78 Antitrust L.J. 105 (2012) (citing sources).
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esting. It is also well positioned in this volume, introducing the
limits thesis as originally conceived before that thesis is broadened and reconceptualized throughout the rest of the collection.
B. PROFESSOR HARRISON
Jeffrey Harrison writes about our limited understanding of
the economics of buyer power—”monopsony”—and its implications for U.S. antitrust law.43 Harrison does not discuss the sort
of intrinsic limit to our antitrust system that Easterbrook addressed—the institutional competence of U.S. enforcers and decision-makers to interpret the law properly to accommodate the
economics of monopsony. Instead, this chapter is about the
common law’s failure to date to accommodate the nuances of
buy-side relationships, having been developed in the context of
sell-side relationships.44 Harrison’s chapter is also about U.S.
antitrust, rather than global competition law, although of
course economic lessons for competition policy are not subject to
import duties. Lianos and Sokol explain that this chapter
speaks to “the complexity of integrating economic concepts in
legal outputs.”45
Harrison teaches that economic theory “generally supports
the idea of comparable treatment” of monopoly and monopsony.46 (He later goes further: “[m]onopsony is the mirror image
of monopoly.”)47 That has always been my understanding. Cases involving employer and other buyer cartels follow rules that
are difficult to distinguish from those involving producer cartels.48 I lecture to my students that it does not matter whether
we view the Overlap Group case,49 which dealt with noncompete agreements among schools in scholarships for particularly attractive students, as an example of a joint exercise of
buyer power (with the students as assets in the educational
43. Harrison, supra note 8.
44. Id.
45. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 4.
46. Harrison, supra note 8, at 55.
47. Id. at 65.
48. Compare Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the
plaintiff in this case could allege that defendants actually formed an agreement to fix MPT salaries, this per se rule would likely apply.”) with Omnicare,
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (alleged buyer
cartel in health insurance industry) and White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d
571 (1st Cir. 2011) (alleged seller cartel involving retail gas stations).
49. See United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
Mark Anderson deserves credit for my understanding of this authority.
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process) or as an example of a joint exercise of seller power
(with students as consumers).
But it is not always so. Harrison goes on to discuss several
areas, including territorial divisions, tying, and group boycotts,
in which monopsony power complicates an analysis crafted for
monopoly power. It is tempting to attribute these complications
to the one-sided nature of antitrust’s goals—protecting consumers but not necessarily investors—but that simplistic characterization misses the complexity of Harrison’s argument. He
notes that sell-side territorial divisions have pro-competitive
justifications, such as the free-rider concern the dissent discussed in United States v. Topco Associates, while buy-side territorial divisions do not. 50 A fuller understanding of both horizontal territorial divisions and monopsony might preserve the
per se rule for buy-side territorial divisions while moving to a
rule of reason approach for sell-side territorial divisions.51
It is not clear that deviations in the law from the economic
understanding regarding the symmetry of monopoly and monopsony reflect an example of a global limit of competition policy. The law of territorial divisions, tying, and group boycotts is
murky in general.52 The limit that Harrison identifies exists
whenever any body of law is in a state of flux. I do not come
away from this chapter with a deeper appreciation of an intrinsic limit on competition policy in global economic governance.
But that does not undermine my appreciation for Harrison’s
contribution. Like Priest’s chapter, this one will inform my future research and teaching, and I imagine it would be of substantial use to an advocate, judge, or policy-maker seeking to
understand better the competitive consequences of a particular
observed practice.
50. Harrison, supra note 8, at 64 (citing United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
51. Id. at 65.
52. Id. at 63. See also Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law
of Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 522 (2007) (“The law governing tying
arrangements is now a focal point of tension between the two major antitrust
philosophies.”); M. Todd Carroll, Note, No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the Sherman Act, 61 WASH. LEE L.
REV. 1235, 1266–68 (2004) (describing the progression from per se treatment
of group boycotts to rule of reason, except in the case of “classic boycotts”); Erica N. Andersen, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate Over ReversePayment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
and In re Tamofixen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1042 (2008)
(noting one instance in which per se treatment of horizontal market divisions
gives way).
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C. PROFESSOR NEBBIA
Paolisa Nebbia’s contribution, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial Practices, was one
I picked for its subject matter. The intersection of competition
law and consumer protection has become a global hot topic in
recent years; Lianos and Sokol observe that it is “a natural area
of overlap in competition and regulation.”53 Many regulatory
agencies world-wide combine the functions, whether in the interest of cost savings or as a matter of best practices.54
Some regulation and theories of enforcement are not easily
categorized as either competition law or consumer protection.
For example, the Federal Trade Commission has prohibited
“fraudulent or deceptive conduct that could harm wholesale petroleum markets,” a prohibition that has both consumer protection (fraud and deceit) and competition (wholesale markets)
facets.55 EU law, the law of South Africa, and some developing
competition regimes have recognized monopoly exploitation—
which in the U.S. presents consumer protection concerns in
some narrow instances under state price-gouging legislation—
as a competition concern.56 (Evidence of frequent enforcement
of exploitation prohibitions is not strong.57)
Scholars recently have studied the intersection of competition law and consumer protection from a few perspectives. One
approach is to view competition policy from a consumer perspective.58 Another is to study the competition policy concerns
53. Lianos & Sokol, Introduction, supra note 11, at 6.
54. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Competition and Consumer Protection Authorities Worldwide, http://www.ftc.gov/oia/authorities.shtm (last visited Aug.
28, 2013). Nebbia is well suited to make a contribution on this topic, working
in the Italian competition authority. Italy’s enforcement agency is another
that combines the consumer protection and competition functions. See
AUTORITÀ
GARANTE
DELLA
CONCORRENZA
E
DEL
MERCATO,
http://www.agcm.it/en (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
55. Prohibitions of Energy Market Manipulation Rule, 16 C.F.R pt.
317(2013).
56. Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, ¶ 23, COM (2009) (EU law);
see Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, (EU Law);
Harmony Gold Mining v. Mittal Steel S. Afr. Ltd., Case No. 13/CR (Feb. 2004).
See generally Gregory B. Adams, European and American Antitrust Regulation
of Pricing by Monopolists, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1985).
57. See David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and
Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for Antitrust, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2008, at 203.
58. See Robert H. Lande, Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using
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of what are classically consumer protection violations.59
Nebbia’s chapter is an excellent contribution to this developing
body of scholarship. She notes the differences between competition law and consumer protection in terms of the types of
claims each encompass as well as the directness of their operation: competition law protects consumers indirectly by ensuring
properly functioning markets, while consumer protection protects consumers directly by attacking individual transactions.60
But Nebbia suggests the complementary nature of the bodies of
law outweighs the differences. Competition law enables the
forces of competition to preserve welfare, and consumer protection fills the gaps that are left when the forces of competition
are insufficient to protect consumers.61
In her description of the complementary nature of consumer protection and competition law, Nebbia recognizes the specific example of “market manipulation” through a process I have
called “behavioral exploitation.”62 “Advertising, promotion, and
price setting are commonly used, to varying degrees, to alter
the process of formation of consumers’ preferences, which constitutes the key assumption of competition law.”63 It is not clear
why Nebbia treats this theory of harm as distinct from her previous category of harm arising in the context of “credence
goods.” Behavioral exploitation represents a more nuanced explanation of an information-economics-based theory of welfare
loss from inadequate disclosures in markets characterized by
disparities in sophistication between the seller and buyer.64
Nebbia offers a potent example of the interplay between
competition law and consumer protection, comparing a challenge brought by the Italian authority under EC Directive
2005/29 of a “mass campaign” by former state monopoly telephone provider Telecom of deceptive statements and omissions
to prevent consumers’ migrating to competitors. The campaign
“involved unfair practices carried out against a large number of
“Consumer Choice” Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 1.
59. See generally Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 42; Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition
Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010).
60. Nebbia, supra note 24, at 127–28.
61. Id. at 128.
62. Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra
note 42, at 130.
63. Nebbia, supra note 24, at 129.
64. Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, supra
note 42, at 135–41.
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migrating customers.”65 The effects “were not limited to the individual case,” but because of a lack of market dominance, Article 102 of the EU Treaty did not apply.66 The same conduct had
taken place in France, with effects on the development of competing telephone service providers. In contrast with Telecom in
the Italian case, France Telecom had market power making “it
possible to resort to Article 102.”67
Nebbia’s contribution speaks to the margins of the traditional views of competition law in a way that truly tests the
substantive limits of that body of law. The intersection of competition law and consumer protection has been explored more
fully in Europe than in the United States, despite the FTC’s
longstanding status as a dual-purpose agency, so perhaps
Nebbia’s contribution is an informative read primarily for a
U.S. lawyer or academic. In particular, policy-makers at an
agency like the FTC might do well to study Nebbia’s arguments
regarding overlap and gap-filling benefits of the two bodies of
law. And this sort of study of the parameters of what competition law can accomplish is precisely what one hopes to find
when opening a volume like Global Limits.
D. PROFESSOR LIANOS
Professor Lianos previously has studied the role of remedies in competition law enforcement, including a forthcoming
book on competition law remedies under EU law.68 His chapter
in Global Limits, Competition Law Remedies: In Search of a
Theory builds on Easterbrook’s recognition that the limits of
competition law are a function of the enforcement of competition law. But Lianos recognizes the importance of remedies to
enforcement.69 “It follows that the existence, or not, of appropriate competition law remedies might set limits to competition
65.
66.
67.
68.

Nebbia, supra note 24, at 131–32.
Id. at 132.
Id.
See generally IOANNIS LIANOS ET AL., COMPETITION LAW REMEDIES IN
EUROPE (forthcoming May 2014); Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, A
Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the E.U. Microsoft Cases, 2010 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 346 (2010).
69. Easterbrook and others writing in his wake frequently assume remedies for a violation are fixed and certain. Under U.S. law, that assumption
holds in private damages litigation (though the amount of damages may remain subject to judicial influence). The assumption fails when the remedy
sought is injunctive relief or when settlement through consent decree or otherwise is a possibility.

20

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[98:7

law intervention.”70 This chapter has the potential to offer the
most direct response to the crucial question the volume’s title
promises to address—where it is that competition policy ends
and regulation begins. Philip Weiser has observed that behavioral remedies—remedial first-order regulation by antitrust
courts and enforcement agencies—are likely to be part of the
future of competition policy, at least in technology industries.71
Lianos raises the example of the Microsoft litigation in
both the U.S. and the EU. In the U.S., the initial remedy ordered was both structural—breaking up the firm—as well as
behavioral—taking steps to increase the number of licensees.72
In the EU, the remedy was behavioral, with Microsoft ordered
to unbundle its Media Player application from the Windows operating system.73 Though Lianos recognizes the remedies in
Microsoft were “relatively complex and far-reaching,” the case
nonetheless represents an interesting choice from which to
propose a theory of remedies for competition law generally. In
terms of size, novelty, and political salience, at least, Microsoft
may be sui generis. Problems or successes in remedying consumer harm in those cases may say very little about competition policy generally.74
Lianos’s purpose is to theorize a comprehensive approach
to remedying competition law violations. Because no settled
approach exists in any jurisdiction, Lianos takes the opportunity—which perhaps no other chapter author in Global Limits
has—to propose a truly global approach. Lianos’s chapter is
more deeply theoretical than the others I studied closely. Its intended targets are either academics or policy-makers, more
than advocates or judges.
CONCLUSION
Lianos and Sokol offer a volume full of new and topical
contributions from around the globe. It is difficult to define a
single purpose for all of the chapters. Of those I studied closely,
70. Lianos, Competition Law Remedies, supra note 10, at 177–78.
71. See Weiser, supra note 20, at 277, 285, 293.
72. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C.
2000), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The structural portion of the
remedy was reversed. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 49
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
73. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-491.
74. But see Weiser, supra note 20, at 279–86 (discussing Microsoft as one
example of what is likely to be a continuing trend of antitrust challenges in
platform industries).
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some introduce a particular jurisdiction’s approach that may be
foreign to the reader; some take a historical approach; some
concentrate on the U.S. experience with antitrust law and economics, relying on the U.S.’s historical first-mover status to
provide the global relevance; and some attack a facet of competition law enforcement that has not been comprehensively theorized in any jurisdiction, let alone globally.
Thinking how I might use this volume in my work, I anticipate a combination of expanding my knowledge in preparation
for class lectures (using, for example, chapters by Professors
Priest and Harrison), providing background on a topic on which
I hope to continue to engage in research (Professor Nebbia’s
chapter), and in some cases offering an utterly fresh theoretical
look at competition law generally (Professor Lianos’s chapter).
Other chapters I will read because of the topic, because I make
a practice of following all of the writing by some of these authors, or because I am unfamiliar with some of these authors’
work and would like to change that.
I introduced this review by suggesting Lianos and Sokol
may have overreached in seizing on the “limits” branding, but I
conclude that if so, it does not matter. Whether the volume succeeds in extending Easterbrook’s thesis to global study of competition law or merely offers a broad and fascinating collection
of writing from an impressive gathering of authors, it serves an
important purpose and is well worth studying closely.

